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1. Introduction 
This note is a follow-up to a study of the Ghanaian rice commodity chain carried out in the 
framework of a capacity building action for the GRIB (C.Coronel, 2008). Whereas the study 
focused on the rice market chain configuration, rice stakeholders’ interactions and constraints 
and their business profitability, this note put the outcome of the study in a broader policy 
perspective by looking at the comparative advantage of the rice production. While the reader 
would certainly benefit from consulting the study report to get more insight into the organization 
of the rice commodity chain, this note can be read separately as it is. 
The objective of this note is to provide GRIB members and secretariat several considerations on 
the current determinant of the efficiency of the rice economy and related critical issues in order 
to backstop their contribution to the policy debate. To facilitate the ownership of the content, 
references to analytical issues are limited as much as possible; experts can however refer to the 
detailed computations presented in appendix. 
2. Rice policy issues in Ghana 
The Ghanaian rice economy has acknowledged a remarkable transformation in the last decade 
with a rapid and sharp increase in per capita annual average consumption, which has shifted from 
around 10 kg in the mid-nineties up to 30 kg in the recent years (recent surveys indicates that per 
capita consumption in urban areas are above 40 kg). This rice diet transition is closely associated 
with the rapid increase of rice imports, which have increased at a commensurate pace during the 
last years, from around 100,000 tons in the mid-nineties to more than 400,000 tons in the recent 
years, Ghana becoming the fifth largest rice importer in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
This rice diet transition have been triggered by a combination of factors including increasing 
urbanization of the Ghanaian population looking for more convenient food than meals based on 
traditional cereals, an increase in per capita income induced by the economic growth and by the 
low price of rice on the world market during the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. While the local rice 
economy has initially benefited from this rice market development and acknowledged an increase 
in its production from around 80,000 tons in the early nineties up to 150,000 tons in the late 
nineties (in milled rice equivalent), rice production is stagnating since then. Accordingly, the share 
of the domestic rice production in the total rice consumption has declined below 25%.  
In order to support the local rice economy, a tariff of 20% has been enforced on rice import 
compounded with a Value Added Tax of 10% that is actually collected on imported rice only. 
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This policy option contrasts with the package of macro-economic and sectoral reforms 
implemented since the early nineties that led to an increasing openness of the Ghanaian economy 
to international competition.   
The mitigated effect of this trade policy option has triggered a lively debate among policy makers 
and stakeholders of the local rice and imported rice commodity chain. An increase of the tariff 
has been considered for a while in 2003 and eventually rejected by decision makers, while 
stakeholders of the local rice economy are increasingly concerned by the enforcement of the 
ECOWAS Common Exterior Tariff in 2008 that would lead to a reduction of the tariff level to 
10%, in line with the tariff applied in the West African Economic and Monetary Union. The 
recent sharp increase in the rice price on the world market is also a new element of the policy 
debate that should be taken into consideration. 
In short the rice policy debate focuses on whether the local rice economy is able to operate in an 
economic environment open to the international competition or if its development requires the 
enforcement of a tariff on rice import. If the selected policy option is to enforce a tariff on rice 
import the ensuing question revolves around the level of the tariff that should be applied taking 
into consideration the interests of both rice producers and rice consumers and the actual impact 
of the tariff enforced on rice production profitability. Thus, the starting point of the policy 
debate is to assess to what extent the Ghanaian economy has a comparative advantage in 
producing rice. 
3. Method for measuring the 
comparative advantage of an 
economic activity 
3.1. The concept of comparative advantages 
The concept of comparative advantages basically considers if a country should produce a good 
with its own domestic resources (labour, capital, land) to supply its population and possibly for 
export, or if it is more economically efficient to import this good and to allocate the spared 
domestic resources to the production of other goods for which the country has a comparative 
advantage.  
The rationale of comparative advantage has been elaborated within the framework of the 
international trade and welfare economy theory, on the bases of which the policy packages of 
trade liberalization and public intervention reduction have been formulated. The underlying 
principle of this conceptual framework is that, if competition prevails, market forces (i.e. prices 
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resulting from supply and demand confrontation) are the best mechanism for allocating 
resources (such as labour, capital, land) across various activities. Even though the relevance of 
this conceptual framework for understanding how an economy works is questioned by several 
scholars and practitioners it remains the dominant framework on the bases of which economic 
policy are formulated and as such keep a pivotal position in the policy debate. Hence, in practical 
terms any contribution to the policy debate will gain in impact and consideration if it refers even 
in a critical perspective to this framework. 
3.2. The computation of a Policy Analysis Matrix 
In practice, the comparative advantages of a productive system are measured through the 
computation of several accounting entities and ratios that have been gradually developed through 
applied research. In the eighties these computations have been consolidated into one analytical 
framework, named the Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM). This analytical framework has been widely 
used to assist in decision making through monitoring trade liberalization processes especially in 
European, South-East Asian and Sub-Saharan countries from the eighties onward.    
The distinction between tradable goods and domestic factors is at the core of the conceptual 
framework. Tradables are goods and services that can be internationally traded and include both 
intermediate inputs required during the process of production (i.e. fertilizer, seeds, fuel, 
machines) and the final output of the production process (i.e. milled rice). It should be 
emphasized that tradables include any inputs and outputs even if they are not actually 
internationally traded (i.e. seeds produced by farmers are considered tradable, as well as fuel 
wood used for rice parboiling). The second category of costs are the domestic factors which 
include basically labour and capital (money) required to produce the final output, even though 
labour and capital cannot be any more considered as “pure” domestic factors in a globalized 
world where international migrations are frequent and where financial markets are increasingly 
integrated. However it is considered that the price or the value of domestic factors is mainly 
determined by local factor markets conditions, especially for labour.  
This concept of "domestic factor" is central to the concept of the comparative advantages as they 
correspond to the resources available from which goods can be produced within the national 
economy. Since there is a limited quantity of domestic factors available, their optimal allocation 
and combination are crucial to ensure the maximum level of efficiency. The profit generated by a 
selected system is measured by subtracting tradable inputs and domestic factors values from total 
tradable output value. Considering that the total output sale is the revenue of the system, this 
accounting identity can be noted as: Revenue = Tradable input + Domestics Factors + Profit. 
This accounting identity is computed using two price systems. The first line of the PAM contains 
the value for this accounting identity measured at private prices, which are the price currently 
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used by the different agents to purchase their inputs and domestic factors and sell their outputs 
(Figure 1).  
Figure 1: 1st row of the PAM 
Revenue ProfitDom. FTrI.= + +Private price:
 
 
The second row of the PAM gives the value of the same identity when it is measured at social 
prices. Social prices are the prices that would prevail if the value of tradables (outputs and inputs) 
and domestic factors were not modified either by the economic policy in place (through tariff, 
tax, subsidy, price intervention) or by markets market imperfections (market segmentation, 
missing market) resulting in price levels that do not reflect the true scarcity of outputs, inputs and 
production factors. In short the second row of the PAM can be seen as a “benchmark” that will 
be used to asses the economic efficiency of the system (Figure 2).  
Figure 2 2nd row of the PAM 
Revenue Tr.I Dom. F+ + (- )=Social price:
 
Consequently, the third row of the PAM obtained by subtracting the social values from the 
private values indicates the magnitude of the transfers induced by the current policy and market 
environment between the prevailing situation at private price and the optimal one at social price ( 
Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3 Computation the 3rd row of the PAM 
Revenue ProfitDom. FTr I.= + +
Revenue Tr .I Dom. F+ + (- )
Tax
=
= Net transfer(- ) + +
-
=
Sub
Private price:
Social price:
Divergences:
 
It is worth noting that the concept of "transfers" is not limited to the actual release of funds to 
the subsector under the form of public subsidies but also include "implicit subsidies" resulting 
from policy measures or market imperfections that modify input or output price levels. For 
instance a ban on the importation of a given output resulting in a high price on the local market 
for this output will be counted as a transfer to the rice sector from the rest of the economy 
because the consumers will pay a higher price for rice than they would have if the ban was not 
enforced. Further more, these transfers can be both positive (in favour of the system analyzed) or 
negative, when economic agents of a selected system will have to pay a higher price for 
purchasing a tradable input due to high level of taxation applied to import it. For instance a tax 
on fuel is considered as a transfer from the agents using fuel to the rest of the economy.  
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The PAM, a three-lines by three-column table, is built on the bases of these accounting identities 
and provide all the different accounting values needed (noted from A to L) to compute the ratios 
required for the analysis of the comparative advantages (Table 1). 
Table 1 The Policy Analysis Matrix 
Revenues
Market prices
Social prices
Divergences
Trad. Inp. Domestic Fac Profit
A DCB
E F G
I J L
H
K
 
3.3. Indicators of comparative advantages 
The PAM provides straightforwardly a range of indicators for assessing the comparative 
advantages of a productive system. If D is positive the system generates profit under the current 
policy and market conditions and is said to be competitive or profitable.  
Similarly, if H is positive the system is able to generate profit without benefiting from any 
transfer from the rest of the economic systems or conversely transferring resources to the rest of 
the economy; in this case the system is said to be economically efficient or to have a comparative 
advantages.  
The computation of a single PAM for one specific system provides only a limited set of 
information for policy formulation that requires choosing between different alternatives. It is 
therefore much more relevant to build a PAM for different technical combinations of inputs and 
domestics factors or for different categories of outputs or for different periods of reference to 
analyze changes across time. The comparison of PAMs, developed for different technologies or 
different products, relies on the computation of ratios that are scale, product and time 
independent in order to derive meaningful comparison. Different types of ratio have been 
developed that provide indication on the different dimensions of the comparative advantages. 
Several ratios can be computed on the basis of the PAM values assessing the comparative 
advantages of a given commodity chain from different perspectives. To shorten this 
methodological presentation we will only present the ratios that will be retained in the analysis 
hereafter. 
The Domestic Cost Resources ratio (DRC) measures the level of comparative advantages 
achieved by the selected systems [DRC=G/(E-F)]. If the DRC is above one, the system has no 
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comparative advantages, meaning that the production of one unit of output will mobilize more 
domestic resources than value added created. If the DRC is below one the system has a 
comparative advantages, and the system is said to be economically efficient.   
4. Computing the PAM for 
selected Ghanaian rice 
commodity systems 
4.1. Selection of the systems to be assessed 
The rice study has characterized eleven rice commodity systems on the basis of the marketing 
channels (local, regional and inter-regional trade between surplus areas and main local rice 
consuming areas), the type of rice cropping systems (irrigated, lowland and upland rainfed), 
traders and milling technology (Engelberg and rubber roller). Consolidated accounts aggregating 
the costs and the revenue at the system level using observed “market prices” has been produced 
for each system. Three systems have been selected for the current analysis based on their 
explanatory capacity. We have focused on the so-called “inter-regional systems” targeting major 
urban markets (Kumasi, Accra, Techiman) where the competition between local and imported 
rice is more acute and can be considered as emblematic of the rice issue. We have also considered 
the larger system in terms of volume marketed and last but not least, systems that combine 
different types of technology at the farm and processing level and the type of milled rice 
marketed (parboiled milled rice or straight milled rice).  
The characteristics of the three selected systems are presented in Table 2. Two systems (System 8 
and 7) 1 target urban consumers in the central region (Ashanti, Bronga-Ahafo) supplied from the 
Northern region where the largest rice surplus are available. These two systems are mainly 
discriminated by the type of rice cropping systems associated: irrigated systems for system 8 and 
lowland unbunded rainfed system 7. This will allow taking into account in the analysis the effect 
of rice production technology intensification on the comparative advantages of the Ghanaian rice 
economy. The third system targets the Accra market from the surplus areas of the Volta region. 
It combines an improved milling technology (using rubber roller) and the production of paddy 
rice under rainfed upland conditions.  
                                                 
1 In order to keep consistency with the study report the numbering of the systems have been kept as they were in the study report 
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Table 2: Main characteristics of the systems selected for computing the PAMs 
N
b 
System 
name 
Marketing 
range Origin 
Destinati
on Farmer Trader 1 Trader 2 
Milling 
system 
Final 
output 
7 Northern to Kumasi 
Inter-
regional 
Tolon/ 
Nanton Kumasi 
Unbunded 
lowland 
average 
Inter-regional 
- Paddy - 
parboiled 
milled rice 
trader 
Retailer 
Milled 
rice 
Small mill 
(Engelberg) - 
2 processing 
line 
Parboiled 
milled rice 
8 
Upper east 
to 
Techiman 
Inter-
regional Kassina Techiman
Irrigated 
non-
intensive 
Inter-regional 
- Paddy - 
parboiled 
milled rice 
trader 
Retailer 
Milled 
rice 
Small mill 
(Engelberg) - 
2 processing 
line 
Parboiled 
milled rice 
9 Volta to Accra 
Inter-
regional Hohoe Accra Upland 
Inter-regional 
- Paddy - 
milled rice 
trader  
Retailer 
Milled 
rice 
Medium mill 
(Rubber 
roller) 
Straight 
milled rice 
It is also important to underline that the three selected systems are the most profitable among the 
five inter-regional systems analyzed in the study: in principle they present the highest potential in 
term of competitiveness and possibly in terms of comparative advantage. 
4.2. Computation and estimation of the parity price 
The consolidated account for each system provides the information needed to compute the first 
line of the PAM. The computation of the second line will be derived from the estimation of 
parity price for tradable output and input; shadow price for the domestic factors will be adjusted 
on the bases of various assumptions. The reference year for the computation of the PAM is 2006.  
1.1.1 Real exchange rate 
The estimation of tradable good parity price should take into account any distortion that could 
prevail on the level of the nominal exchange rate (i.e. the exchange rate that apply to get foreign 
currency from a commercial bank). For instance, an over-valuation of the exchange rate means 
that less Cedi is needed to get one USD than it would be the case otherwise. Accordingly the 
price of the imported good in Ghanaian Cedi would be lower than the one that would prevails if 
the exchange rate would not have been affected by a particular policy measures (such as fixed 
exchange rate, public control on currency allocation to various importers….). Since the Ghanaian 
currency market has been liberalized in the last decades the level of distortion between the 
nominal exchange rate and the real exchange rate should be very limited (the exchange rate that 
would prevail without any distortions induced by the currency public policy). This is confirmed 
by the latest macro-economic review carried out by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 
2007). Accordingly while the average nominal exchange rate was computed at 9,170 Cedi for one 
USD in 2006, the real exchange rate applied to compute tradable parity price was increased by 
5% at 9,600 Cedi for one USD. 
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1.1.2 Parity price for milled rice. 
There is a large diversity of types of local and imported rice retailed on the Ghanaian market 
depending upon a number of quality attributes (perfume, non-perfume, parboiled, straight milled 
rice, origin of the production). In principle, the comparative advantage of a given commodity 
chain supposes that the domestic output should have the same attribute as the product available 
on the world market that will be taken as a reference to compute the parity price. The 
heterogeneity of the rice marketed requires formulating a particular rationale to compare the local 
and imported rice. 
Looking at the international rice price, we take as a reference the 5% broken rice corresponding 
to the higher segment of the rice market, since up to the recent years the share of lower quality 
rice in the Ghanaian rice imports have been rather limited compared to the situation observed in 
other Western African countries. Furthermore, a large share of the rice imported in Ghana is 
likely to be parboiled rice (as in the case of Nigeria), which better fit to Ghanaian rice cooking 
habits and preference. Parboiled rice is generally marketed on the world market at a higher price 
than straight milled rice. Taking this category of imported rice as a reference might also be 
justified by the fact that the average income consumers’ could shift to the local market if it is 
more sensitive to price. 
Rice price on the world market varies according to their country of origin (Table 3). For instance 
the 5% broken rice exported by Thailand gets a higher price than the same category of rice 
exported from Vietnam. Accordingly, the parity price for the milled rice is computed on the 
bases of a weighted average of the price earned by major rice suppliers to Ghana. Based on data 
published by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), USA, Thailand and Vietnam are major 
rice suppliers to Ghana and it is assumed that each country contribute on average to one third of 
total Ghanaian import. India might be a supplier but more irregularly. Eventually a parity price of 
316 USD/ton has been taken to compute the PAM.  
Table 3: International Rice price by category of quality (Annual average FOB; USD/ ton) 
 
Source: http://www.arroz.agr.br/site/interarroz/interrice.php 
Further to the determination of a world market price, it is also necessary to take into account 
price differential between local and imported rice induced by variation in quality. The average 
yearly price differential has been computed on the basis of the retail price data published by 
SRID at the national level from 2001 to 2007 (Figure 4). To take into account the decreasing 
trends of the price differential, a differential of 15% between local rice price and imported rice 
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has been factored in for system 8 and 7, which use Engelberg milling technology, while the price 
differential has been reduced to 5% for the system 9 where paddy rice is milled with rubber 
roller. It should in principle produce a milled rice of higher quality compared to system 8 and 7. 
Figure 4: Average Price differential between imported and local rice (national average) 
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Source: computed from SRID 
1.1.3 Parity price for tradable input 
The computation of parity price for tradable inputs consists in taking into account the level of 
tariff, tax or subsidy applied to the importation of these goods and to compute a parity price by 
deducting the value of the tariff or the tax and conversely by adding the value of any subsidy to 
the current market price. A list of tariff applied for deducting the parity price is attached in annex.  
The purchase value of any good used by an agent of the rice commodity systems include a share 
of domestic factors mobilized to market the tradable input from the harbour to the place where 
the agent purchases the input. Thus the corresponding purchase value is broken down into a 
tradable, a labour and a capital component. By convention for tradable input such as fertilizer we 
assume that the labour and capital required to market the product represent only a minor share of 
the purchase value (10%).  
The breakdown of complex inputs used by the agent of the commodity systems such as transport 
or milling services required the computation of representative budgets for each specific activity to 
estimate more precisely the respective share of tradable and domestic factors contained in the 
price paid by the farmer or the trader. A representative budget has been established for activities 
that represent a major share of the costs such as transport, milling services (for Engelberg and 
rubber roller technology) and mechanized agricultural operations (land preparation and 
harvesting). The decomposition of the purchase value allows also to take into account the impact 
of tariff and subsidy applied on the tradable use by the suppliers of such an activity on the 
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corresponding parity price of the service. For instance, when the tariff and tax applied on fuel is 
deducted from the transport budget the parity price for the shipment of good is reduced by 12%. 
Conversely taking into account the implicit subsidy on electricity resulting from preferential tariff 
still enforced (World Bank, 2007) the cost of milling at parity price is increased by 19%. The 
coefficients used for decomposing the value of cost into tradable and domestic factors and the 
corresponding budget are attached in annex. 
4.3. Determining the level of distortion on domestic factors 
The estimation of the social value of the domestic factors is less straightforward as it cannot be 
backstopped by the value of similar input on the world market. A first adjustment can be made 
taking into account the impact of particular official regulation on factors costs, although no 
particular evidence of such distortion were found from the literature.  
For capital, the interest rate offered by commercial bank is usually used as the opportunity cost 
faced by agents that invest their capital in a given economic activity. The opportunity cost of a 
trader who invests its capital in rice marketing will be equal to the value of the interest that it 
would perceived if he has deposited the same amount of money in a saving account, taking into 
account differences in the risk associated with the investment. In this case the interest rate 
proposed by the Bank of Ghana (12% per year) has been taken as the capital opportunity cost at 
market price. The capital opportunity cost at social price has been computed by deducting the 
inflation from the interest rate, which gives a rate of 3%. 
The assessment of the labour opportunity cost is much more complex. For paid labour we 
assume that the wage paid to the labourer is the opportunity cost of the labour at both market 
and social price. For family labour used in rice farming it is not possible to assess thoroughly the 
opportunity cost of the labour allocated to rice cultivation without taking into account all the 
different income earning opportunities that the farmer’s family would have on the farm and 
outside the farm. Given the variation that characterized the demand for paid labour in rural areas 
depending upon the cropping calendar and the type of activities it is difficult to assume that the 
wage that applied during peak season is representative of the labour value during the slack season 
of the cropping calendar, where demand for paid labour is very low. For instance, in the Hohoe 
upland rice production areas, the prevailing daily wage is 15,000 Cedi per day of labour. A rice 
farmer that would renounce to crop is plot to work as a labourer could only expect to get this 
income for a limited number of days during the season, let say about 30 days, meaning that his 
daily wage for the whole rice cropping season of 180 days would be much lower (30 days of 
labour x 15,000 cedi / 120 days of the whole season = 3,750 Cedi). However, on-farm and off-
farm income opportunities should be also taken into consideration. Given the lack of 
information on this issue we have arbitrarily fixed the opportunity cost of farmers’ family labour 
at 10,000 in the Northern region and at 12,000 in the Hohoe region which is closer to the coastal 
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urbanized areas where more labour opportunities may prevail compared to the Northern 
region. For less demanding agricultural operations such as bird scaring, which represents a large 
amount of labour and that is often assigned to children the opportunity cost of labour have been 
reduced by half. 
5. Comparative advantage of 
the selected rice commodity 
systems 
The PAMs have been computed using specific spreadsheets, which are attached in appendix. The 
most salient results will be presented and discussed in this section. 
5.1. PAMs computed for the selected systems 
A first outcome of the computations is that the major source of divergence between the 
performance of the selected systems at market price and at social prices are essentially due to the 
variation of value of the milled rice price (revenue), whereas the tariff, tax and subsidy applied on 
the value of tradable inputs has only a minor effect on the total divergence. For instance, in the 
case of the PAM computed for System 7 (unbunded rainfed lowland rice produce in the 
Northern region and marketed in Kumasi) (Table 4) the divergence for tradable input represents 
only 187 Cedi per kg of milled parboiled rice marketed at Kumasi, while the current tariff and tax 
applied on imported rice represent a value of 1,587 Cedi per kg of rice marketed at Kumasi. The 
positive divergence for the tradable inputs means that rice systems spent more money under the 
current economic environment to deliver one kg of milled rice at Kumasi than it would have if 
tariff, tax and subsidy on tradable input where removed. However the variation is very marginal. 
On the contrary the high level of distortion on the output side (revenue) means that the system 
as a whole would earn much less income if tariff on rice import where removed. The system is 
still profitable at social price (profit of 328 Cedi per kg), meaning that it has a comparative 
advantage and is able to compete with imported rice suppliers even without the enforcement of 
tariff on rice imports. It should be noted, however, that the profitability of the system would be 
considerably reduced by the removal of the tariff on rice import. 
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Table 4: PAM for the System 7 Cedi per kg of mille rice marketed in Kumasi from unbunded 
rice field in Northern region. 
     COSTS         
 REVENUES TRADABLES DOMESTIC PROFITS 
   INPUTS FACTORS    
 A  B  C  D  
PRIVATE  6 905  3 200  2 017  1 688 
PRICES         
 E  F  G  H  
SOCIAL  5 318  3 052  1 937  328 
PRICES         
 I  J  K  L  
DIVERGENCES  1 587  148  80  1 359 
         
 
Table 5: PAM for the System 8 Cedi per kg of mille rice marketed in Techiman from irrigated 
field in Upper-East region. 
   COSTS     
 REVENUES TRADABLES DOMESTIC PROFITS 
   INPUTS FACTORS    
 A  B  C  D  
PRIVATE  6 905  2 041  2 420  2 444 
PRICES         
 E  F  G  H  
SOCIAL  5 318  2 007  2 329  982 
PRICES         
 I  J  K  L  
DIVERGENCES  1 587  34  91  1 462 
         
 
Table 6: PAM for the System 9 Cedi per kg of mille rice marketed in Accra from upland field in 
Volta region. 
   COSTS     
 REVENUES TRADABLES DOMESTIC PROFITS 
   INPUTS FACTORS    
  A  B  C  D  
PRIVATE  6 905  1 182  4 198  1 525 
PRICES         
  E  F  G  H  
SOCIAL  5 012  1 113  4 000  -100 
PRICES         
  I  J  K  L  
DIVERGENCES  1 892  70  198  1 625 
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The DRCs computed from the three MAPs show (Table 7) that while the commodity systems 
linking the Northern region to urban markets in Ashanti and Bronga-Ahafo regions have a 
comparative advantage (DRC inferior to 1), the position of System 9 is much more fragile (DRC 
= 1.03) which is rather unexpected since a similar analysis carried out in other Western African 
countries shows that low input rice cropping system tend to have a higher comparative advantage 
than input intensive rice cropping system (F.Lançon, 2001). This outcome might be due to the 
value of the technical coefficient (yield at the farm level, quantity of labour used, quantity of 
agricultural input applied…) and prices that has been taken as a reference to compute the PAM 
and it therefore critical to take into account the sensitivity of the DRC to technical coefficients 
and price variations. 
Table 7: Indicators from the baseline PAMs per system 
  
System 7 - 
Northern to 
Kumasi 
System 8 - 
Upper east 
to Techiman 
System 9 - 
Volta to 
Accra 
DOMESTIC RESOURCE COST (DRC) 0.86 0.70 1.03 
5.2. Major determinant of the rice based comparative advantages 
The sensitivity analysis consists in looking at the effect of the variation of one variable (price, 
technical coefficients) on the value of the ratio computed with PAM. The analysis shows that the 
DRC value is highly sensitive to the level of yield and the parity price (see appendix), while 
variations on the value of domestic factors (labour opportunity costs, real interest rate) have a 
much lower effect on the value of the DRC. 
Table 8, Table 9, Table 10 display the value of the DRC that would be obtained by different 
combinations of yield and parity price of the milled rice for each system. For instance, in the case 
of System 7 for the current parity price of 320 USD per ton, the DRC will be above 1 if the yield 
achieved at the farm level would decrease from 2,000 to 1,750 kg of paddy rice per hectare. 
Similarly, in the case of the upland based system (Table 10) an increase in the yield by 10% from 
1,000 kg per hectare up to 1,100 kg would result in a DRC below 1. 
Table 8: System 7: DRC sensitivity analysis to yield and parity price variations 
 Yield level 
Parity price 1500 1750 2000 2250 2500 
200 6.58 2.72 1.78 1.36 1.12 
220 4.18 2.15 1.50 1.18 0.99 
240 3.06 1.78 1.30 1.04 0.88 
260 2.41 1.52 1.14 0.93 0.80 
280 1.99 1.33 1.02 0.85 0.73 
300 1.70 1.18 0.92 0.77 0.67 
320 1.48 1.06 0.84 0.71 0.62 
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340 1.31 0.96 0.77 0.66 0.58 
360 1.18 0.88 0.72 0.61 0.54 
380 1.07 0.81 0.67 0.57 0.51 
400 0.98 0.75 0.62 0.54 0.48 
 
Table 9: System 8: DRC sensitivity analysis to yield and parity price variations 
  Yield level  
Parity price 3000 3250 3500 3750 4000 
200 1.44 1.29 1.17 1.07 1.00 
220 1.30 1.17 1.06 0.98 0.91 
240 1.18 1.07 0.98 0.90 0.84 
260 1.09 0.98 0.90 0.84 0.78 
280 1.00 0.91 0.84 0.78 0.73 
300 0.93 0.85 0.78 0.73 0.68 
320 0.87 0.80 0.74 0.69 0.64 
340 0.82 0.75 0.69 0.65 0.61 
360 0.77 0.71 0.66 0.61 0.58 
380 0.73 0.67 0.62 0.58 0.55 
400 0.69 0.64 0.59 0.55 0.52 
 
Table 10: System 9: DRC sensitivity analysis to yield and parity price variations 
  Yield level   
Parity price 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 
200 2.04 1.82 1.66 1.53 1.43 1.34 1.28 1.22 
220 1.87 1.67 1.53 1.41 1.32 1.24 1.18 1.13 
240 1.73 1.55 1.41 1.31 1.22 1.15 1.10 1.05 
260 1.61 1.44 1.32 1.22 1.14 1.08 1.02 0.98 
280 1.50 1.35 1.23 1.14 1.07 1.01 0.96 0.92 
300 1.41 1.27 1.16 1.07 1.01 0.95 0.90 0.86 
320 1.33 1.19 1.09 1.01 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.82 
340 1.26 1.13 1.03 0.96 0.90 0.85 0.81 0.77 
360 1.19 1.07 0.98 0.91 0.86 0.81 0.77 0.74 
380 1.13 1.02 0.93 0.87 0.81 0.77 0.73 0.70 
400 1.08 0.97 0.89 0.83 0.78 0.74 0.70 0.67 
 
For the System 8 based on irrigated rice the initial PAM computed didn’t take into consideration 
the cost of the irrigated scheme development. According to information provided by GIDA the 
cost for developing one hectare of irrigated field could be estimated at around 15,000 USD per 
hectare (including dam and canal building) a figure that is commensurate with other sources 
(FAO, 1997). If the cost for establishing the infrastructure for irrigation is factored in the DRC 
(with the same yield and parity price level) would increase from 0.74 up to 1.6 and the value of 
the corresponding transfers from the rest of the economy to this rice system would increase from 
1,500 Cedi up to 4,150 Cedi per kg of milled rice deliver at Techiman. There is a debate among 
scholars whether the cost of the irrigation infrastructure should be factored in for irrigated 
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schemes that have been developed several years ago since they can be considered as “sunk 
costs” that should be borne in any case by the economy. In other words, while investing in new 
irrigation scheme development might not be efficient from an economic point of view, the 
production of rice on existing irrigated schemes can be considered as a viable option since the 
operation of these cropping systems are profitable at social price. If any new investments in 
irrigation are considered its might be necessary to improve the cost effectiveness of the scheme 
building since the system 8’s DRC is equal to 1 when the irrigation cost are above 5,500 USD per 
hectare. 
6. Concluding remarks 
The assessment of the comparative advantage of the rice commodity systems should be taken as 
one contribution to the rice policy debate and should not be considered as the only criteria for 
deciding whether or not it is economically sound to invest in rice cultivation. Firstly the outcome 
of the computation is highly sensitive to the variations of the prevailing conditions on the world 
rice market. A system that did not have any comparative advantages in the early 2000 when price 
on the rice world market were below 250 USD per ton can have a comparative advantage in 2007 
when world rice price is 350 USD per ton. Secondly, objectives pursued by any policy are 
multiple and may combine both economic efficiency and equity objectives. 
The selected rice commodity systems do have a comparative advantage but it remains fragile. 
Keeping in mind that the selected systems were the most profitable in the rice study it means that 
the comparative advantages of the Ghanaian rice economy remain weak under the current 
technical performance (yield level) and rice world market environment (level of the milled rice 
parity price). Put differently, the profitability of most of the rice system would be put at stake 
without any form of price support for the milled rice output. 
The recent increase of rice price on the world market has certainly strengthened the comparative 
advantage of the Ghanaian rice economy but given the historical high volatility that characterized 
rice price on the world market it should not be taken as granted. The most recent projections of 
the expected evolution of world rice price conclude that they would stabilize around a level of 
350 USD in the forthcoming five years (OECD-FAO, 2007). Longer-term projections remain 
very tentative as the world market may change with the evolution of consumers’ diet in emerging 
Asian economies that will put less pressure on rice demand and hence free additional sources of 
supplies for other importing regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa. In any case, at medium term the 
changing conditions on the rice world market open a window of opportunity to invest in rice 
production development in Ghana under sound economic conditions. 
However, the question of the objective pursued by the rice policy remains open for debate. 
Should the policy put the priority on efficiency objectives and favour the development of the 
  
16
systems that have the stronger comparative advantages or should the rice policy be considered 
as an instrument for reducing income disparity through the generation of income opportunities? 
The formulation of a well-founded answer requires taking into account the position of rice in the 
various farming systems where rice is produced to assess the net impact of a policy that would 
focus primarily on efficiency objectives. It would assess to what extent farmers’ resources could 
be allocated to other activities that provided comparable income. It goes beyond the analysis 
carried out on one commodity system. The rather higher comparative advantage of the rice 
systems based in the North compared to Southern rice systems shows that both objectives are 
not necessarily conflicting, since rice has certainly a higher economic importance for farming 
systems in the North than in the South where there is probably more on-farm and off-farm 
income opportunities. 
One major drawback of a tariff policy is that it benefits uniformly to all rice systems in the 
countries, the one that are economically efficient and the one that are not, meaning that support 
is given to systems that may better allocate their domestic resources to other agro-food activities. 
Another issue is that farmers may not get the full benefit of the price increase induced by the 
tariff if farmers’ linkages to market are not efficient, either because there are inefficiency in the 
marketing systems or because the local rice is not a pure substitute to the imported rice since it 
does not benefit of the same quality attributes. The performances of paddy production at the 
farm level remain a key determinant of the economic efficiency of the rice commodity chain, 
however the benefit of any policy aiming at supporting the value generated by rice production 
will be ultimately determined by the quality of the technical and organisational process that link 
farmers’ output to consumers. Hence, the enforcement of a tariff on rice import can only be 
justified if it is conceived as a component of a policy package that addresses the issue of rice 
system efficiency in a broader holistic approach.  
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Appendixes  
1. Parity prices computations 
Milled rice computation details 
Unit Source of infor. Value at Market 
Price
Value at Social 
price
FOB to CIF
FOB price in vietman USD/ton Data 316 316.47
Transport  cost USD/ton Data 80 80
Insurance (FOB+ freight *1.2) USD/ton Data 5 5
CIF price at Tema USD/ton Data or comp 401 401
Exchange rate Data 9170 9628.5
CIF price in domestic currency unit C/ton Computed 3 679 257 3 863 220
Duties
Import duty 20% of CIF %/CIF 0.2 735 851
Insepection chage, ecawas… %/CIF 0.02 73 585
Total duties 809 437
Price after custom Computed 4 488 694 3 863 220
VAT + NHIL Price afer c 0.15 673 304
Price after VAT Computed 5 161 998 3 863 220
Handling cost 15USD/ton C/ton 137 550
Price at the warehouse in cedi/ kg 5 300 3 863
W holesaler Transport cost 200 200
Other costs (warehouse, bagging, financial cost) 1000 1000
wholesaler margin (7%) 0.03 455 455
Wholsale price at parity point 6955 5518
Retailer cost c/kg 103 103
Retailer margin (10%) 0.070 494 494
Retailer price at parity point 7552 6115
Penalties for lower quality 0.15 6567 5318
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Decomposition coefficients and tariff used for tradable inputs parity prices computation 
Decomposition coefficients and tariff applied for tradable input
L QL K TI Chk Source Ad valorem 
rate
source
Fixed cost
Irrigation 0.50 0.00 0.10 0.40 1.00 from other study 0.03 CEPS, 2003 assuming low 
tarif band for 
building 
metarial
Building 0.40 0.00 0.30 0.30 1.00 educated guess 0.03 CEPS, 2004
Bags 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.90 1.00 educated guess 0.03 CEPS, 2004
Agricultural equipment 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.90 1.00 educated guess 0.03 CEPS, 2004
Vehicle for transport of goods 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.90 1.00 educated guess 0.24 CEPS, 2004
Spare parts for motor vehicle 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.90 1.00 educated guess 0.28 CEPS, 2004
Spare parts for machines 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.90 1.00 educated guess 0.03 CEPS, 2004
Input
Agricultural input 0.05 0.05 0.90 1.00 educated guess 0.03 CEPS, 2004
Fuel 0.05 0.05 0.90 1.00 educated guess 0.24 computed 
from table 
provided by 
consultant
Services
Milling engleberg (market) 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.36 1.00 computed from miller 
budget
Milling engleberg (social) 0.29 0.00 0.62 0.49 1.40 computed from miller 
budget applicable to 
market value and 
tkaing into account 
subisdy on electricty 
(30% of market 
value)
Milling rubber roller (market) 0.28 0.00 0.26 0.46 1.00
Milling rubber roller (social) 0.29 0.00 0.29 0.46 1.04
Transport 0.11 0.00 0.16 0.73 1.00 computed 0.25
Mechanized agri. operation 0.09 0.16 0.74 0.99 0.24
Irrigation maintenance 0.33 0.07 0.12 0.48 0.10 part of the 
maintenace is 
using enegy
Production of electricity 0.05 0.05 0.60 0.30 based on other 
analysis taking into 
account that a share 
of electricity is 
coming from 
hydraulic sources
-30.00 subisidy to 
electricty
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Budgets for computing the share of tradable, labour and capital for complex input 
Rubber Roller Miller 
Format for Intermediate inputs decomposition coefficients 
Interest rate 0.12
per km
Equipment depreciation
Item Equipment value Annual 
capacity
Capacity 
needed 
for 
act iv ity
Unit of 
capacity
Life time 
(year)
Used up 
portion
Residual 
value
Ad valorem 
duty
Fixed duty Financial cost 
and import 
tax
Depreciation
100% 0 0
Building 20 000 000 255000 255000 kg 30 100% 0 0.00% 1 816 206 666 667
Machine 60 000 000 255000 255000 kg 15 100% 0 3.50% 4 944 720 3 864 734
Electric m otor 8 000 000 255000 255000 kg 10 100% 0 3.50% 642 926 772 947
Drying pavement 8 000 000 255000 255000 kg 20 100% 671 030 400 000
100% 0 0
T otal 8 074 883 5 704 348
Decomposition coefficients
L
NQ
L
Q
K TI L
NQ
L
Q
KI TI
Fixed cost
Equipment cost TI depreciation 5 704 348 1 0 0 0 5 704 348 1 1.70%
Equipment  Financial cost 8 074 883 1 0 0 8 074 883 0 1
Variable cost
0 0 0 0 0
Operator 8 400 000 1 8 400 000 0 0 0 1
Attendant 3 600 000 1 3 600 000 0 0 0 1
Watchman 4 200 000 1 4 200 000 0 0 0 1 0%
Electricity 10 200 000 0.1 0.6 0.3 1 020 000 0 6 120 000 3 060 000 1 -30%
Lubricant and spare part 30 000 000 0.1 0.1 0.8 3 000 000 0 3 000 000 24 000 000 1 6%
Government tax 240 000 1 0 0 240 000 0 1 0%
Land rent 840 000 1 0 0 840 000 0 1 0%
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
T otal 71 259 231 0.28 0.00 0.26 0.46 20 220 000 0 18 274 883 32 764 348 1
Coefficient at parity/social price
5 704 348 1 0 0 0 5 704 348 5 704 348
8 074 883 1 0 0 8 074 883 0 8 074 883
Operator 8 400 000 1 0 0 0 8 400 000 0 0 0 8 400 000
Attendant 3 600 000 1 0 0 0 3 600 000 0 0 0 3 600 000
Watchman 4 200 000 1 0 0 0 4 200 000 0 0 0 4 200 000
Electricity 10 200 000 0.142 0 0.852 0.426 1 448 400 0 8 690 400 4 345 200 14 484 000
Lubricant and spare part 30 000 000 0.1 0 0.1 0.76 3 000 000 0 3 000 000 22 665 600 28 665 600
Government tax 240 000 0 0 1 0 0 0 240 000 0 240 000
Land rent 840 000 0 0 1 0 0 0 840 000 0 840 000
71 259 231 0.28 0.00 0.28 0.44 20 648 400 0 20 845 283 32 715 148 74 208 831 1.04
0.29 0.00 0.29 0.46 0.28 0.00 0.28 0.44 1
Decomposition coefficient
Coefficient 
check
Duty on 
tradable
Coeff icients ValuesValue at market 
price
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Engelberg miller 
Format for Intermediate inputs decomposition coefficients 
Interest rate 0.12
per km
Equipment depreciation
Item Equipment value Annual capacity Capacity needed 
for activity
Unit of capacity Life time (year) Used up 
portion
Residual 
value
Ad valorem 
duty
Fixed duty Financial cost 
and import 
tax
100% 0
Building 10 000 000 336000 336000 kg 40 100% 0 0.00% 963 036
Machine 28 000 000 336000 336000 kg 15 100% 0 3.50% 2 307 536
Drying pavement 4 000 000 336000 336000 kg 10 100% 0 307 937
100% 0
100% 0
Total 3 578 509
Decomposition coefficients
L
NQ
L
Q
K TI L
NQ
L
Q
KI TI
Fixed cost
Equipment cost TI depreciation 2 453 543 1 0 0 0 2 453 543 1
Equipment  Financial cost 3 578 509 1 0 0 3 578 509 0 1
Variable cost
0 0 0 0 0
Bag handling 1 000 000 1 1 000 000 0 0 0 1
Operator 5 400 000 1 0 0 5 400 000 0 0 0 1
Electricity 20 400 000 0.1 0.6 0.3 2 040 000 0 12 240 000 6 120 000 1
Lubricant and spare part 8 000 000 0.1 0.1 0.8 800 000 0 800 000 6 400 000 1
Government tax 240 000 1 0 0 240 000 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
Total 41 072 052 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.36 9 240 000 0 16 858 509 14 973 543 1
Coefficient at parity/social price
2 453 543 0.958772771 2 372 865 2 372 865
3 578 509 1 3 578 509 3 578 509
Bag handling 1 000 000 1 1 000 000 0 0 0 1 000 000
Operator 5 400 000 1 5 400 000 0 0 0 5 400 000
Electricity 20 400 000 0.14 0.00 0.85 0.43 2 896 800 0 17 380 800 8 690 400 28 968 000
Lubricant and spare part 8 000 000 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.75 800 000 0 800 000 6 037 736 7 637 736
Government tax 240 000 0 0 0 0 0 0
35 040 000 0.21 0.00 0.44 0.35 10 096 800 0 21 759 309 17 101 001 48 957 110
0.29 0.00 0.62 0.49 0.21 0.00 0.44 0.35 1
Coefficients ValuesValue at market 
price
Decomposition coefficient
Coefficient 
check
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Mechanized agricultural operations 
Format for Intermediate inputs decomposition coefficients 
Interest rate 0.12
perd day of operation 7 ha/day 17.5 acres per day 50 days 875
Equipment depreciation
Item Equipment value Annual 
capacity
Capacity 
needed 
for 
activity
Unit of 
capacity
Life time 
(year)
Used up 
portion
Residual 
value
Ad valorem 
duty
Fixed duty Financial cost 
and import 
tax
Depreciation
100% 0 0
Equipment 250 000 000 50 50 days 20 100% 0 3.40% 21 380 720 12 088 975
100% 0 0
100% 0 0
100% 0 0
100% 0 0
Total 21 380 720 12 088 975
Decomposition coefficients
L
NQ
L
Q
K TI L
NQ
L
Q
KI TI
Fixed cost
Equipment cost TI depreciation 12 088 975 1 0 0 0 12 088 975 1 24.00% 6%
Equipment  Financial cost 21 380 720 1 0 0 21 380 720 0 1
Variable cost
0 0 0 0 0 0%
Driver 1 500 000 0 1 0 1 500 000 0 0 1 0%
Lubricant 10 000 000 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.8 500 000 500 000 1 000 000 8 000 000 1 28% 4%
Spare parts 12 088 975 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.8 604 449 604 449 1 208 897 9 671 180 1 28% 5%
Fuel 220 150 000 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.8 11 007 500 11 007 500 22 015 000 176 120 000 1 24% 91%
0 0 0 0 0 0%
0 0 0 0 0 0%
Total 277 208 670 0.04 0.05 0.16 0.74 12 111 949 13 611 949 45 604 618 205 880 155 1
Coefficients ValuesValue at market 
price
Decomposition coefficient
Share of TICoefficient 
check
Duty on 
tradable
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Transport 
Format for Intermediate inputs decomposition coefficients 
Interest rate 0.12
per km
Equipment depreciation
Item Equipment value Annual 
capacity
Capacity 
needed 
for 
activity
Unit of 
capacity
Life time 
(year)
Used up 
portion
Residual 
value
Ad valorem 
duty
Fixed duty Financial cost 
and import 
tax
Depreciation
100% 0 0
Vehicle 500 000 000 25000 25000 km 15 100% 0 24.00% 46 530 399 26 881 720
100% 0 0
100% 0 0
100% 0 0
100% 0 0
Total 46 530 399 26 881 720
Decomposition coefficients
L
NQ
L
Q
K TI L
NQ
L
Q
KI TI
Fixed cost
Equipment cost TI depreciation 26 881 720 1 0 0 0 26 881 720 1 24.00% 6%
Equipment  Financial cost 46 530 399 1 0 0 46 530 399 0 1
Variable cost
0 0 0 0 0 0%
Driver 14 400 000 0 1 0 14 400 000 0 0 1 0%
Lubricant 25 000 000 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.8 1 250 000 1 250 000 2 500 000 20 000 000 1 28% 4%
Spare parts 50 000 000 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.8 2 500 000 2 500 000 5 000 000 40 000 000 1 28% 9%
Fuel 500 000 000 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.8 25 000 000 25 000 000 50 000 000 400 000 000 1 24% 87%
0 0 0 0 0 0%
0 0 0 0 0 0%
Total 662 812 120 0.04 0.07 0.16 0.73 28 750 000 43 150 000 104 030 399 486 881 720 1
100%Decomposition coefficient
Share of TICoefficient 
check
Duty on 
tradable
Coefficients ValuesValue at market 
price
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2. Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity of the Domestic Resource Cost ratio to various variables: 
System 7 
labour opportunity 
cost 
real interest rate
real exchange rate 
Parity price 
conversion rate
Yield
-0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
 Correlation coefficient
 
System 8 
labour opportunity 
cost 
real interest rate
real exchange rate 
ratio
Parity price
Yield 
conversion rate 
-0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
 Correlation coefficient
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System 9 
real interest rate 
labour opportunity 
cost 
Yield
real exchange rate 
ratio
conversion rate 
Parity price
-0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
 Correlation coefficient
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3. Policy analysis matrices 
